Abstract-Type-based proxy re-encryption can solve the finegrained delegation perfectly, and being more and more important in applications. However, as we know, there is still a problem come up with type-based proxy re-encryption in adaptive corruption model. In this paper, we propose a typedbased proxy re-encryption in the adaptive corruption model without random oracle; the scheme is CCA secure and proxyinvisible. Compared with the type-based proxy re-encryption proposed by J.S.D in 2013, this scheme has advantages in both security and efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
In order to delegate the decryption right from one part (the delegator) to another part (the delegatee), the concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE) was proposed by M. Blaze, G. Bleumer, and M. Strauss [1] in 1998. In a PRE scheme, the semi-trusted proxy with the re-encryption key generated by delegator transforms the cipher text under the public key of delegator into the cipher text of another one (we call it delegatee), and the proxy cannot obtain any information about the plaintext under any public key. PRE schemes turn to be a useful primitive, especially in following fields, distributed file system, encrypted emails forwarding and access of the encrypted files in cloud storage.
A. Related Work
In the document [1] , based on E1Gamal's public key encryption scheme, Blaze and others presented a specific PRE scheme. In this scheme, proxy can transform the ciphertext under Alice's public key to the ciphertext of Bob's and vice versa. Thus, this scheme is bidirectional (the PRE scheme which can only support one-way transformation is unidirectional). But, unfortunately, Alice (Bob) can plot together with proxy to obtain the private key of Bob (Alice). We call this scheme non-master-key secure. This problem is quite serious, as users generally use the same secret keys for both their encryption schemes and signature schemes and thus the success of plotting together can get rid of the non-repudiation ensured by signature schemes. Later, Jakobsson [2] and Zhou and others [3] proposed a method to solve the problem of master key insecurity in [1] , in which more than one proxy is used. But, in essence, the problem of master key insecurity is not resolved by dong this. In documents [4] , based on secret key sharing technology, the delegator's secret key is divided into two parts, one part given to the proxy and the other part given to the delegatee. Using this technology, Ivan and Dodis put forward a general method to construct unidirectional PRE scheme in [4] . Although this way of construction shows great improvements compared with previous methods, it suffers from the following disadvantages: i. besides a personal secret key, the delegatee has to store another secret message from the delegator. ii. though it is impossible for the delegator and proxy to plot together to obtain the secret key of the delegatee, the delegatee and proxy are able to plot together to get the secret key of the delegator, which causes the loss of the security of master key.
However, as mentioned in many documents [5] , the schemes discussed previously can only achieve chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) security, while, in actual use, the schemes are often required to achieve chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) security. Lately, based on another secret key sharing technology, Green and Ateniese respectively proposed the first CPA secure and CCA-secure identitybased unidirectional PRE scheme in [6] . The key factor that distinguishes this new secret key sharing technology from the one of Ivan and Dodis is that the second part of the secret key is not sent to the delegatee directly by the delegator. Instead, it is sent to the proxy after encrypted by public key of delegatee's. Finally, the proxy sends it to the delegatee. In this way, it is unnecessary for the delegatee to store extra secret message. But their scheme can't satisfy master key security.
All the above-mentioned schemes are proved secure under random oracle model, but it does not mean that they are also secure in real life. In the 2007 ACM CCS conference, Canettiand and Hohenberger proposed the first bidirectional PRE scheme that is proved CCA-secure under standard model [5] . They had excellent results. To achieve CCA secure, Canetti used the technology of Canetti, Halevi and Katz mentioned in documents [7] , by which any chosen-ID secure identity-based encryption scheme is transformed into a CCA-secure public key encryption scheme. In 2010, J. weng [8] proposed a CCA-secure unidirectional proxy re-encryption in the adaptive International Conference on Computer Science and Service System (CSSS 2014) corruption model, in which the adversary can choose the corrupted users adaptively.
To deal with fine-grain delegation, Tang [9] proposed a new definition, named type-based proxy re-encryption (TB-PRE) and give the first proxy-invisible TBPRE scheme. However, Tang's scheme is only CPA-secure. Weng [10] proposed another definition, called conditional proxy reencryption (CPRE) almost at the same time. The two definitions are identical in essence (we call type-based proxy re-encryption in the following text). TBPRE scheme only allows proxy to re-encrypt files of some types set by delegator, so TBPRE realizes the selective delegation. The definition and secure model of CPRE were formalized by Weng and Yang in [11] , and a CCA-secure CPRE scheme was proposed in random oracle model. Jun Shao [12] proposed the definition of identity-based conditional proxy re-encryption (IBCPRE) in 2011, and proposed the first CCA-secure IBCPRE scheme in random oracle model．In 2012, Jae woo seo et al. [13] proposed a proxy-invisible TBPRE scheme, that is RCCA-secure (the cipher text will tolerance a harmless damage) without random oracle. But the scheme is not CCA-secure in the adaptive corruption model.
B. Organization
We organize our paper as follow. Some preliminaries are given in Section II. In section III, we give the definition and secure model of type-based proxy re-encryption. Our concrete construction of type-based proxy re-encryption and the efficiency analysis is given in section IV. In the last section V, we conclude our paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notations
If I is a finite set, then R xI  denotes the operation of selecting an element x of I uniformly at random; [] x  denotes its first  bits, and [] x  denotes its last  bits.
B. Complexity Assuption
The security of our scheme is based on 3-Quotient Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (3-QDBDH) assumption [14] , which has been used by Jian Weng to construct CCA-secure PRE schemes in adaptive corruption model. 
B. Secutity Model of TBPRE
The difference between the security model of adaptive corruption model and that of non-adaptive corruption model is that challenger can generate the challenge cipher text successfully for the adversary in the former case, even if the adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt users; but the adversary must commit ahead of time the target user that he wants to attack in the later case. The security of TBPRE in adaptive corruption model is similar to the security of unidirectional single-hop PRE in Weng [8] . Here we omitted the definition of the security model.
IV. CONCRETE SCHEME
We construct a proxy-invisible TB-PRE scheme that is CCA-secure under adaptive corruption model without random oracle. 
B. Analysis of Security and Efficiency
1) The security of our scheme is as followings: Theorem 1
Under the assumptions of that the hash function 0 H is collision resistant and F is a pseudorandom function family [15] , our scheme is chosen-cipher text attack secure at second level cipher text while the 3-QDBDH assumption holds in groups 12 ( , ) GG . The proof of theorem 1 is similar to that of theorem 1 in Weng [8] , we omit it here.
Theorem 2
Our scheme is IND-TBPRE-CCA secure at the first level cipher text, assuming the hash function H is collision resistant, F is a pseudorandom function family and the 3-QDBDH assumption holds in groups 12 ( , ) GG . The proof of theorem 2 is similar to that of theorem 2 in Weng [8] , we omit it here.
Lemma 1
If there is an adversary A who can break the MSS-PRE security [8] of a single-hop unidirectional PRE scheme, then there also exists an adversary B who can
